**Hermeneutics of Climate Inaction: The Concept of Anthropocide**

In 1992, 154 states ratified the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and pledged to stabilize greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations at levels that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Yet, since the UNFCCC was adopted, annual CO2 emissions have increased by more than 80 percent. Scientific evidence unequivocally indicates that climate inaction is likely to have a far greater impact than the most serious crimes that currently attract international criminal responsibility. Therefore, states should be held responsible for their failure to tackle the climate crisis and the criminal nature of climate inaction should be acknowledged. Yet, the nature of the crime in question is uncertain.

To clarify this issue, this paper first undertakes a comprehensive analysis of the specificities of climate damage. This damage is characterized by its intensity, global reach, and multifaceted nature. Unlike traditional forms of environmental damage, it represents an indirect form of harm that manifests over various temporal scales. Additionally, the damage associated with climate change is characterized by a high level of uncertainty, which is a cause for concern rather than a reason for reassurance.

The paper then discusses various arguments that have been put forward to exempt states from their responsibilities in terms of climate mitigation. Climate inaction consists of a set of actions and omissions, but states can be held responsible for both. While the failure of states to take action on climate change is not primarily motivated by an explicit intention to harm individuals or groups, the absence of intent does not absolve states from their responsibility, as the damage caused by climate change is foreseeable. The collective nature of climate inaction does not provide any excuse not to act on mitigation either. Although acting on climate change is undeniably a difficult task, states are uniquely positioned to perform it and are therefore responsible for their failure in this respect.

The analysis of the specific features climate damage and climate inaction indicates none of the existing legal or philosophical categories, such as crime against humanity, ecocide, violation of human rights, or existential risk, adequately describe climate inaction. This paper introduces the notion of “anthropocide” to fill this gap. From the Greek *anthropos*, human being, and the Latin *caedere*, to kill, this termrefers to the set of state omissions and actions that are destroying the essential foundations of life of multiple human groups on Earth through their contribution to climate change.

The paper provides a detailed definition of this crime and examines various criteria, such as temperature targets, per capita emissions, and global emission trajectories, to determine under which conditions a state is to be held responsible for it. Finally, the presentation explores the legal and political aspects of the concept of anthropocide. An assessment is made of the roadblocks to incorporating the notion of anthropocide into domestic and international law, as well as the implications of the concept for climate activists and, more broadly, for citizens from high-emission countries.